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ABSTRACT
The main thrust of this thesis is to build a dynamic model of a Command and
Control (C2) system and, by manipulating various aspects of the model, determine
the effects of Command and Control Warfare (C2W) on the system. The model
used is a prototype for battle damage assessment in C2W. A description of how
the model was constructed and discussions of the decisions concerning what to
model and of the difficulties and deficiencies associated with the model are also
included.
The model is constructed using the Design/CPN and Workflow Analyzer
software, produced by Meta Software. It consists of a JTF information handling
system in a hostile environment. The basis for this model is an Integrated
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Over 10,0 00 years ago, wars were fought for land
ownership. This period in time is referred to. as the era of
agricultural wars, where face-to-face combat was the basic
method of warfare used. The weapons used were primitive and
relied on human brute force to achieve their goals. Orders
were given orally and hardly ever in writing.
The industrial revolution brought about another type of
warfare. The mass production of goods and materials led to a
war of mass destruction. This type of war is referred to as
the industrial war or the mechanized war. Weapons were
produced to destroy entire regions, societies, and industrial
centers
.
Nuclear weapons, space assets, advanced computer
capabilities and rapidly growing telecommunications have
brought about a complex and formidable danger to the
warfighter. Today's warfighter is faced with a technological
war. Wars are no longer being fought to destroy the land or
other physical assets of the enemy, but are fought to destroy
the command and control centers, the nerve, of the enemy by
means of computer viruses, communications breakdowns and
psychological warfare, by means of the media.
1. The Need for Battle Damage Assessment
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is the evaluation of
damage sustained during an attack. It includes the total
number of lives lost, equipment and structural damages and the
degradation of information or communications systems. BDA not
only is conducted for one's own forces but those of hostile
and allied forces affected by the attack. The definition may
seem simple, but the processes or methods used for damage
assessment are complex. Therefore, improved methods of
conducting BDA are required to keep up with the rapidly
changing face of war.
Distorted assessments continue to be a major problem
for the men in the field, not to mention the commander trying
to get a timely and accurate picture of the battle being
fought. The commander must rely heavily upon the timely
information given to him by those inspecting the battlefield.
The importance of accurate BDA during Operation Desert Storm
was noted by General Schwarzkopf:
...too much optimism could prompt us to launch the ground
war too soon, at the cost of many lives; too much pessimism
could cause us to sit wringing cur hands and moaning that
the enemy was still too strong. [Ref. l:p. 499]
2. Traditional Methods of BDA
During both eras of agricultural and industrial wars,
BDA was conducted by physical site inspections. The damage
was then estimated by the obvious visible damage to equipment,
land and structures. The damage assessment was often slow
and inaccurate.
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Modern warfare, an electronic warfare, has moved the
battle from the land to the heart of the command and control
center, its communications links and computers. Today, the
commanders out in the field can no longer rely upon those
physical inspections conducted because computer viruses are
being utilized by both hostile and friendly forces as a weapon
to "take out" the opposition's command and control.
Viruses may be introduced into the computer through a
variety of vehicles, ranging from access to a corrupt
network to, potentially, infection from a clandestine
computer chip on an expansion card or other peripherals
.
[Ref. 2:p. 19]
B. OVERVIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C 2W)
The definition of Command and Control Warfare (C 2W) used
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is as follows:
Command and Control Warfare: The integrated use of oper-
ations security (OPSEC) , military deception, psychological
operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW) and physical
destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny
information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C 2
capabilities, while protecting friendly C 2 capabilities
against such actions. [Ref. 3:p. 2]
The strategies and techniques of conducting C 2W have
changed with the times. Prior to the publication of the
Memorandum of Policy No. 30 [Ref. 3], C 2W was referred to as
Command, Control, and Communication Countermeasures (C 3M) . C 2W
now focuses more on how wars are being fought and supports all
three levels of conflict: strategic, operational and tactical.
C 2W incorporates two elements: Counter-C 2 and C 2
Protection. Both elements implement five tools (or methods)
which support each other. These tools are: OPSEC, military
3
deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction. A successful
C 2W strategy is the integration of the five tools throughout
the planning, execution, and termination cycle of any
operation.
Counter-C 2 is defined as:
...to prevent effective C 2 of adversary forces by denying
information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the
adversary C 2 system. [Ref. 3:p. 2]
The following is the definition of C 2 Protection:
...to maintain effective C 2 of won forces by turning to
friendly advantage or negating adversary effort to,
influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C 2 .
[Ref. 3, p. 2]
A quote from Mao Tse-Tung could summarize the importance
of command and control warfare. It is as follows:
To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy
blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his
co^imanders to distraction by creating confusion in their
minds. [Ref. 4, p. 89]
His reference to the "eyes and ears" of the enemy is
essentially the command and control center. Creating confu-
sion can be achieved by the implementation of the five tools
of C~W previously mentioned.
C . PURPOSE
The scope of this thesis is to build a dynamic model of a
command and control system and to determine the effects of C 2W
on that system. The model designed for the experiment is a
prototype for battle damage assessment in C 2W. The effects of
C 2W are modeled by manipulating various functions and
activities of the model.
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The foundation for this prototype is the ANSER model. The
ANSER model is a process model of the command and control
information needs of a "generic" Joint Task Force Commander
(JTFC) . The main objective of the model is to focus on a set
of functions or activities and determine their relationship
with the Corporate Information Management (CIM) methodologies.
II. THE MODEL
A. THE ANSER MODEL
Corporate Information Management (CIM) is a process model
which focuses on the management methods used within the
Department of Defense. CIM is a dynamic model used to simu-
late the flow of resources through various processes. It is
used to uncover any bottlenecks or any idle resources within
a system. It could also be used to establish interactions,
cost and resource consumption within a system.
The ANSER model is a result of the Joint Staff's efforts
to create a process model using the CIM methodologies. The
main focus of the ANSER model is to simulate the command and
control needs of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) . The
JTFC may utilize such a model to ensure that the system is
being used efficiently. It is a useful decisionmaking tool to
the commander, for he can see the problem areas in his system.
B„ THE C 2 LOOP
1. Department of Defense Definition of Command and
Control
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and
control (C 2 ) as:
The exercise of authority and direction by a purposely
designated commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures
employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission,, [Ref. 5: pp. 77]
This definition separates C 2 into a collection of
functions and the systems of people, procedures, and equipment
that support command. This study first looks at how to model
the functions of C 2 and then adds the systems that support
these functions.
2. Lawson's C 2 Process
Fundamentally there is very little difference be-tween
the C 2 system used by most forces in World War II and a modern
one found anywhere in the world today. In fact a gen-eric
model of C 2 , such as the one proposed by Joel S. Lawson, would
probably be as applicable to the system used by
Alexander the Great as it would to that of General
Schwarzkopf
.
The Lawson model (Figure 1) uses five functions to
encompass all of the activities that take place within a C 2
system. These five functions are: sense, process, compare,
decide, and act. The sense function gathers data on the
environment in which the C 2 system exists— including
friendly, allied, and hostile forces, terrain, weather,
political happenings, and so on. The process function groups
this data together, correlates it, and then filters it to
provide the commander with useful information about the
environment. The compare function compares and contrasts the
existing state of the environment --the relative strengths,
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weaknesses, positions, etc. --with the desired state, the
commander's view of what the state of the environment should
be. The decide function chooses among the available courses
of action for reconciling the two states. Finally the act
function translates the decision into action.
3. Using Lawson's Model
Superimposing Lawson's model onto the Anser model of
a Joint Task Force (JTF) [Ref. 6:pp. 5-55] resulted in the
separation of the five functions into two categories: those
internal to the JTF and those external. The functions
internal to the JTF are process, compare, and decide, while
sense and act are
external. It may be argued that both sense and act are also
internal to the JTF; however, as the focus of this study is
the information flow internal to the JTF and neither of these
functions are an integral part of that flow, they may be
safely categorized as external.
C. THE IDEFO MODEL
The next step in this study was no create a model of the
activities involved in each function using the Integrated
Computer Aided Manufacturing Def inition (IDEF) standard for
describing systems. The activities listed in the Anser model
will be assigned to the three internal functions and then
converted to an IDEFO model.
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Figure 1: Lawson's Model of the C 2 Process [Ref . 7:p. 32]
1 . An Overview of IDEFO
IDEFO is a graphical portrayal of the processes within
an organization. It shows the logical interdependencies of
various activities but says nothing about the time flow.
Hence one can determine the functions that deal with each
other, the order they do it in, and what is needed by each,
but nothing can be determined about how long each takes to
perform its activity.
There are seven definitions essential to an
understanding of an IDEFO model. They are:
1. Activity - named process, function, or task having one
or more occurrences;
2. ICOM - an acronym for Input, Control, Output, and
Mechanism;
3. Input - resources consumed by the activity;
4. Control - activity blueprints, plans or directives;
5. Output - activity products;
6. Mechanism - tools used in an activity;
7
.
Decomposition - the breaking down of an activity into
its component subactivities
Using uhe above definitions, any organization can be
decomposed into its component activities with inputs,
controls, outputs, and mechanisms required for each activity.
Thus a detailed, but static, graphical representation is
created. This was already accomplished by Anser for the JTF
so that all that remained of this step in the study was to
assign activities to C 2 functions.
2. IDEFO Model of the C 2 Loop
In their report, Anser decomposed the JTF as far as
four levels below the top level diagram. It was necessary to
determine which of the activities and on which levels to
assign to each function of the C 2 loop. This required a
careful reading of the activity definitions in order to
perform the appropriate matching. As an example, here is the
definition for activity A113 - Evaluate Impact
:
The process of evaluating the impact of identified
significant events within their environment and assessing
the current and future effect in light of the National
Security Strategy, CINC's Theater Strategy and Objectives,
and the JTF ' s Operational Objectives and mission.
[Ref .6:p. B-2]
Careful examination of this definition clearly shows
it to be part of the process function. Therefore, it was
assigned to that function. Table 1 shows an example of the
matrix constructed from matching the activities and functions.
The entire matrix is contained in Appendix A.
Table 1: EXAMPLE ASSIGNMENT MATRIX
Function Activities
Process Alll, A112, A113
A careful comparison of the assignment matrix and the
ANSER model will show that all activities after A51 were
excluded. The basis for this was the categorization of those
activities as belonging to the act function and hence not
gerirv/.ne to this study. Again, the argument could be made that
since the JTF has forces, the activities which govern their
employment should be included in the study. However, though
information handling does take place within these activities,
they are not a basic part of the JTF information handling
system.
This is a good point to discuss the measure of effec-
tiveness (MOE) chosen for the study. Since the Commander,
Joint Task Force (CJTF) Execute Order is the last link in the
internal information handling chain and it is the method by
which the CJTF activates the forces involved, it was
determined that the time necessary to produce the Execute
Order was the best MOE. The assumption made for this MOE is
that the order will take longer to produce if the C 2 loop has
been degraded.
At this point the IDEFO model was constructed using
Design/IDEF, a program created by Meta Software Corporation.
This provided a static model of the JTF information system;
however, it did not allow study of the behavioral charact-
eristics of the system. For that, a tool for dynamic repre-
sentation of the system was needed. Petri nets filled that
need.
D. THE COLORED PETRI NET (CPN) MODEL
1 . An Overview of CPN
A Petri net is a tool for the study of systems
.
Essentially it is a mathematical representation (model) of the
system to be studied. Analysis of the net can provide
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information on the structure and behavior of the modeled
system.
Any Petri net has five primitive components: tokens,
places, transitions, inputs, and outputs. A token is an
object used to define execution of the Petri net. For this
study a "packet" of information was used. A place is a
location tokens are assigned to (or reside in) . Transitions
equate to activities, processes, or functions. The "firing"
of transitions moves tokens, while the arrival of tokens
enables the firing of transitions. Inputs and outputs are
functions that map either a transition to a set of places or
a place to a set of transitions
.
The structure of a Petri net is of the form
C = (P,T,I,0), where:
1
.
C = the Petri net structure
2 P = the set of places
3 T = the set of transitions
4 I = the input functions
5. = the output functions.
These are the "rules" for the mathematical representation of







Ktj) = (Pi) 0(tj) = {p 2 ,p 3 }
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Kt 2 ) = {p 2 ,P 3 } 0(t 2 ) = {p 4 } .
The structure of a Petri net is necessary, but a
visual representation of the system is often more useful. For
visual representation there is the Petri net graph, which is
nothing more than a graphical representation of the structure.
Figure 2 is a Petri net graph of the structure used earlier.
Note that it is easy to follow and gives at a glance all the
information it contains. For this reason most applied work is
done using the graph while most theoretical work is done using
the structure.
Marking takes the Petri net one step further by
assigning tokens to places. This step provides a snapshot of
the model at a given moment. Figure 3 is the marked version
of the Petri net used before. The format for the marked Petri
net is M = (C,u), where:
M = the marked Petri net
C = the Petri net structure
u = a function mapping the set of places, P, to the non-
negative integers N.
Hence, the marked Petri net in Figure 3 would be:
M = (C,u)
C = (P,T,I,0) u = (1,2,0,0)
P = {Pl,P 2 'P3'P4>
T = (t^ta)
Ktj) = {p x } 0(t 1 ) = {p 2/ p 3 }













Fig :re 2 : Petri Net Graph
Figure 3 : Marked Petri Net
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A marked Petri net looks good but says nothing about
the tokens or the purpose of the model . To be of any real
use, the information must be associated with the tokens. When
this is done, a colored Petri net (CPN) is the result. This
was the next step to be performed on the ANSER JTF model.
2. CPN Model of the C 2 Loop
To come up with a useful model it was necessary to
determine what a token would represent, what time unit would
be used, the duration of each activity, and any special
considerations for modeling specific situations, such as
indecisiveness and C 2W. Early on it was determined that since
the focus of the study was the information system, the token
should represent a "packet" of information that would appear
tc be sufficient to make a decision under normal
circumstances. It was decided that in order to keep the model
as flexible as possible, the time unit would not be specified.
Thus the distance from headquarters and the availability of
communications systems can both be modeled, or ignored, with
equal facility. The assignment of activity durations were
straightforward. Using Design/IDEF, each activity was
arbitrarily assigned a duration of one time unit. Then the
activities within each C 2 function were lumped together into
a black box and the durations summed. This sum was assigned
to the black box of each function as its total duration.
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The decision on how to model indecisiveness and C 2W
was driven by the software. The assignment of probabilities
to specific paths (outputs) along with the creation of dummy
activities was the method used to model indecisiveness and
C2W. For indecisiveness, a 0.80 probability was assigned to
the output to the next black box while a probability of 0.20
was assigned to the output of a dummy activity with a duration
equal in value to the activity from which the output came from
(Figure 4) . Modeling C 2W required a more complicated form and


























Figure 4: Model for Indecisiveness
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The definition of C 2W decomposes into three basic
categories for modeling purposes. They are:
1. Attacks against the information before the system
receives it;
2 . Attacks against the systems that process or move the
information; and
3 . Attacks against the personnel handling the information
and making decisions using it.
While each type of attack is different, the effect of
each is to degrade or destroy the overall systems 's capability
to turn information into a usable product (an execute order in
this case) . Since the focus is on the effects (as opposed to
the details of the methods) of the attack, modeling the
effects of each can be done using many of the same techniques
for ail of them.
2 . Methodology
The basic building blocks used in modeling C 2W were
the same as those used in modeling indecisiveness;
probabilities and dummy activities. First each activity was
decomposed into a main activity and a series of dummy
activities (Figure 5) . Probabilities were then assigned to
each output to reflect the uncertainty of success of an attack
of a specific type. The basic probabilities were 0.80 to




























igure 5: Modeling C'W
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As it was possible to have more than one attack at a time,
there were probability products. These products were reduced
so their sum would be 25, thus ensuring that enough
differences would show up during the simulation runs.
The next step in construction of the model was the
assignment of subtypes of mechanisms to the appropriate
activities. This assignment would allow manipulation of the
speed of processing. Specifically, subtype DA (Data Attack)
was used for attacks against incoming information, subtype CD
(C 3 Degradation) was used for attacks against the systems and
subtype PSY (psyops) was used for attacks directed against the
personnel involved.
To model attacks against information it was necessary
to add a dummy activity to the front end of the model whose
function was to either accept or reject the information
received. When attacks are present, the speed factor of the
system subtype "DA", which is assigned to the activity,
confirms that data is increased (that is, it will take longer
to perform the activity) . If the simulator determines, using
the assigned probabilities, chat the attack was successful,






This model was built and run using a set of software
produced by Meta Software Corporation: Design/IDEF,
Design/CPN, and Work Flow Analyzer. Two Macintosh Ilci
computers with 70Mb of RAM were used as the platforms for the
experiment, each running Design/CPN System 7.
Due to the limited RAM of the computers only ten runs
of the model could be made for each cycle of the simulator.
Additionally, the limited RAM also excluded use of the Excel
spreadsheet as an output. As a result, each cycle required
initializing the simulator, running the model, manually
extracting the data, and clearing the report. Finally, at the
end of five cycles, the levels of each of the factors would be
adjusted as required.
2. Assumptions
Certain assumptions were made to enable the use of
this model. Theses assumptions were:
1. No action can be taken by JTF forces without orders
;
2. Orders are issued only when sufficient information is
available; and
3. The CJTF will try to get sufficient information to issue
orders
.
The following assumptions were made in order to allow
analysis of the data:




2. There is mutual independence among the various samples;
and
3. Distributions are assumed to be identical.
3. Statistical Design
To ensure the assumption of normality was valid, 50
runs were made for each configuration. There were three
factors (data attack, C 3 degradation, and psyops) at two
levels (1 or 2) for a total of eight configurations. A
balanced, multifactor ANOVA was made on the data.
4 . Hypotheses
Seven null hypotheses were formulated to test the
model. They are as follows:
1. Information Attacks
Information attacks have no effect on the time needed
to produce the CJTF Execute Order.
2. C 3 Degradation
C 3 degradation has no effect on the time needed to




Psyops have no effect on the time needed to produce
the CJTF Execute Order.
4. Information Attacks And C 3 Degradation
There is no interaction between information attacks
and C 3 degradation.
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5. Information Attacks And Psyops
There is no interaction between information attacks
and psyops.
6. C 3 Degradation And Psyops
There is no interaction between C 3 degradation and
psyops
.
7. Information Attacks, C 3 Degradation And Psyops
There is no interaction between all three factors
together.





A. RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION RUNS
After each cycle of the simulator, the time to produce the
execute order was transferred from the Excel-ready output
form, used by Work Flow Analyzer, to a data collection work-
sheet. From there the data was transferred to a Minitab
worksheet in a form that would allow a balanced, multi-factor
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of the data. The three factors
and the output of the model were each assigned a column, while
each row of the worksheet represented one run of the model.
Then the levels one and two were assigned to each factor,
according to the speed factor assigned to the appropriate
mechanism subtype for that run. This is shown in Figure 6.
For example row one of Table 2 would translate as:
DA speed = 1.0, CD speed = 1.0, and PSY speed = 1.0, resulting
in TIME (to produce execute order} = 45.
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Table 2: EXCERPT FORM MINITAB WORKSHEET
CI C2 C3 C4
DA CD PSY TIME
1 1 1 1 45
2 1
-i iX 82
3 1 I 1 52
4 1 1 1 45
5 1 1 1 80
6 1 1 1 45
7 1 1 1 45
8 1 1 1 50
9 1 1 1 48
10 1 1_L i 45
The next step was to analyze the data from the runs.
Given the hypotheses that were being tested, the first form of
the ANOVA test was DA*CD*PSY, an interaction between all three
factors. The values of interest were the p-values for each
factor and cross-products, as these would indicate the lowest
value for which a .given hypothesis could be rejected. The
results of the first ANOVA are shown below in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: FIRST ANOVA TEST INPUTS
FACTOR TYPE LEVELS VALUES
DA fixed 2 1 2
CD fixed 2 1 2
PSY fixed 2 I 2
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Table 4 : FIRST ANOVA TEST RESULTS
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
DA 1 65869 65869 55.24 0.000
CD 1 82398 82398 69.10 0.000
PSY 1 104039 104039 87.25 0.000
DA*CD 1 63 63 0.05 0.818
DA*PSY 1 9264 9264 7 .77 0.006
CD*PSY i 1541 1541 1.29 0.256
DA*CD*
PSY
_]_ 44 44 0.04 0.847
ERROR 392 467443 1192
TOTAL 399 730661
The factors that appeared to be significant at this
point were DA, CD, PSY, and DA*PSY. The p-value for each was
low enough to virtually assure rejection of the associated
hypotheses. Further testing was required to ensure that each
factor was truly significant. The second ANOVA test was of
the form DA*PSY and the results are shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: SECOND ANOVA TEST INPUTS
FACTOR TYPE LEVELS VALUES






SECOND ANOVA TEST RESULTS
SOURCE DF
111
SS MS F P
DA -L 65869 65869 47 .30 0.000
PSY 1 104039 104039 74.71 0.000
DA*PSY 1 9264 9264 6.65 0.010
ERROR 396 551489 1393
TOTAL 399 730661
Once again DA and PSY appeared clearly to be signi-
ficant as their p-values remained (zero) . On the other hand
there was a slight increase in the p-value for DA*PSY.
Nonetheless, it was considered significant as a value of 0.01
is usually the lowest used, and the hypothesis can be rejected
for any value equal to or greater than that. The only test
remaining was of each factor taken alone, the results of which
are shown in Tables 7 and 8
.
Table 7: THIRD ANOVA TEST INPUTS
FACTOR TYPE LEVELS VALUES
DA fixed 2 1 2
CD fixed 2 1 2
PSY fixed 2 1 2
Table 8: THIRD ANOVA TEST RESULTS
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
DA 1 65869 65869 54.53 0.000
CD 1 82398 62398 68.21 0.000
PSY 1 104039 104039 86.13 0.000
ERROR 396 478355 1208
TOTAL 399 730661
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It was now clear that all three factors were sig-
nificant by themselves as was the interaction of DA and PSY.
It was then possible to decide whether or not to reject the
hypotheses previously stated. Based on the above results
obtained, the following decisions were made:
1. Information Attacks
Attacks against the data have no effect on the time
required to produce the CJTF Execute Order. There-
fore, the hypothesis is rejected. Clearly data
attacks did affect the production time as witnessed by
the p-value for that factor.
2 . C 3 Degradation
C 3 degradation has no effect on the time required to
produce the CJTF Execute Order. Therefore, the
hypothesis is rejected. CD is clearly a significant




Psyops have no effecc on the time required to produce
the CJTF Execute Order. Therefore, the hypothesis is
rejected. Like DA and CD, PSY is clearly a signifi-
cant factor.
4. Information Attacks And C 3 Degradation
There is no interaction between data attacks and C 3
degradation. Therefore, the hypothesis is NOT
rejected. The ANOVA tests clearly show that DA*CD
is not a significant factor.
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5. Information Attacks And Psyops
There is no interaction between data attacks and
psyops. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected. The
ANOVA test shows that for values greater than or
equal to 0.01 this was a significant factor.
6. C 3 Degradation And Psyops
There is no interaction between C 3 degradation and
psyops. Therefore, the hypothesis is NOT rejected.
CD*PSY had much too high of a p-value to consider it
significant
.
7. Information Attacks, C 3 Degradation, And Psyops
There is no interaction between data attacks, C 3 deg-
radation, and psyops. Therefore, the hypothesis is
NOT rejected. Like CD*PSY, the p-value here is too
high to conclude that this cross was significant.
The rejection of four of the hypotheses yielded
information necessary to the verification of the experiment's
design. Their relation to the model then was the next step in
the study.
B. VARIATIONS OF THE MODEL
1. First Variation
The first variation attempted for this study involved
changing the probabilities used at the outputs of the
activities that determine whether an attack of a specific type
is successful or not. In the original model, the basic
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probability of success for an attack was 0.20 and the
probability of an unsuccessful attack was 0.80. In this vari-
ation, the probabilities were changed to 0.30 and 0.00
respectively and then all probability products were recomputed
(the actual numbers assigned were 5, 2, 2, and 1) . What
difference would this make as far as the analysis and the
hypotheses? This was the question to be verified based on the
data shown in Tables 9 and 10 for the DA*CD*PSY ANOVA.
Table 9: DA*CD*PSY ANOVA TEST INPUTS
FACTOR TYPE LEVELS VALUES
DA fixed 2 1 2
CA fixed 2 1 2
PSY fixed 2 1 2
Table 10: DA*CD*PSY ANOVA TEST RESULTS
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
DA 1 118267 118267 101.00 0.000
CD 1 111957 111957 95.61 0.000
PSY 1 260917 260917 222.83 0.000
DA*CD i 14448 14448 12.34 0.000
DA*PSY 1 243 243 0.21 0.649
CD "PSY 1 31791 31791 27.15 0.000
DA*CD*
PSY
1 5761 5761 4.92 0.027
ERROR 392 459000 1171
TOTAL 399 1002384
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There were some differences noted. DA*CD and CD*PSY
were shown to be significant, and the three-way interaction
was significant for a p-value greater than or equal to 0.027
(the commonly used p-value is 0.05) . These results led to the
rejection of all but one hypothesis. The only one not
rejected is that there is no interaction between data attacks
and psyops
.
It was clear that changing the output probabilities
would influence the significance of the interactions. Would
changing the probabilities used to model indecisiveness have
a similar effect? This was the next question to be verified.
2. Second Variation
The output probabilities were returned to 0.2 and
0.80 while the probabilities used for indecisiveness were
changed to 0.90 for the go-ahead and 0.10 to get more
information. The results of the DA*CD*PSY ANOVA are shown in
Tables 11 and 12.
Table 11: DA*CD*PSY ANOVA TEST INPUTS
FACTOR TYPE LEVELS VALUES
DA fixed 2 1 2
CD fixed Z I 2




DA*CD*PSY ANOVA TEST RESULTS
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
DA 1 73197 73197 70.80 0.000
CD i 105657 105657 102.20 0.000
PSY _l 114075 114075 110.34 0.000
DA*CD 1 7788 7788 7.53 0.006
DA*PSY 1 5235 5235 5.06 0.025
CD*PSY 1 1509 1509 1.46 0.228
DA'CD*
PSY
1 348 348 0.34 0.562
ERROR 392 405257 1034
TOTAL 399 713067
In this variation only two interactions are signif-
icant, DA*CD and DA^PSY. Clearly changing the indecisiveness
probabilities had some effect as noted by the decreased p-
values for DA*CD and DA*CD*PSY to that of the original model.
The variation of the indecisiveness probabilities did not have
the same effect on the interactions as changing the output
probabilities. The relationship between the output
probabilities may have been the cause of the interactions in
this model; however, this relationship is beyond the scope of
this study and will be left to any follow-on research. The
final step to this study was to determine the validity of the
experiment
.
3 . Validity of Experiment
The purpose of the model design was to vary the speed
factor of the specific mechanism subtypes which would randomly
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affect the time required to produce the CJTF Execute Order.
If the design were correct, then each subtype (identified as
a factor in ANOVA testing) would be significant and the
hypothesis of the opposite effect would be rejected. This is
the case for this model. Analysis of the experimental data
verified the accuracy of the experiment's design.
The design of the model was such that the factors
would be additive, as verified by the large values obtained
for che TIME column. An unexpected result was discovered even
though there was no attempt to build in interactions between
the factors. The unexpected result was that of an interaction
between DA and PSY, which is considered a synergistic effect.
The reason for this is unclear, but it prompted the idea of
varying parts of the design to see what would happen.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this study a prototype model for battle damage
assessment in C 2 warfare was built. The purpose was to
provide an easier avenue for research into the effects of C 2W
in an unclassified environment. Commercial off-the-shelf
software was used that allowed a study of the dynamic behavior
of a JTF information handling system in a hostile environment.
The model worked well in as much as it performed as it was
designed to and is of simple construction. It is not as
flexible as was hoped for, but that is due to its construction
as opposed to any inherent limitation of the software.
Research in this area and with this model /software shouldn't
stop here. There are several possibilities for follow-on
research. One possibility is to generalize the model for
force structures other than the JTF. This could prove useful
in a wider range of situations. A second area would be to
marry the model with simulated (or actual) methods of
measuring communications. A different MOE might be discovered
or another way to infer the one used in this study. Another
possibility would be to assign "true" values to the subtypes
used for data attack, C 3 degradation, and psyops . Done in
connection with a more detailed breakout of the force's C 3
structure (including performance data on systems and number of
personnel for each activity), this could be extremely useful.
An extension of uhis would be to study the cost of C 2W to
34
enemy forces or the cost of C 2W defense to friendly forces
.
A final possibility is to incorporate the model into automated
mission planning. This might prove to be very interesting if
it can be done.
C 2 warfare will only grow in the importance it plays in
modern warfighting. Proper preparation requires continued
research outside the classified environments where it is
usually conducted. This model and its successors can provide
the tools for that research.
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APPENDIX A - ACTIVITY ASSIGNMENT MATRIX
Function Activities
Process Alll, A112, A113
Compare A2 1 , A2 2
Decide A23, A311, A312, A313,
A3211, A3212, A3213, A3214,
A3215, A3216, A322, A323,
A3311, A3312, A3313, A3314,
A3315, A3316, A332, A333,
A341, A342, A343, A411, A412,
A413, A414, A421, A422, A423,
A43,A51
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APPENDIX C - EXPERIMENTAL DATA
CI C2 C3 C4
DA CD PSY TIME
-1
1 1 1 45
2 1 1 1 82
3 1 1 1 52
4 i 1 1 45
5 1 1 1 80
6 1 1 1 45
7 1 _L 45
3 -L -L 1 50
9 1 1 1 48
10 -i 1 1 45
11 1 1 1 47
12 1 1 83
13 1 1 1 82
14 1 1 1 50
15 1_ 1 1 45
16 1 1 1 80
17 1 1 1 83
18 1 1 1 83
19 1 1 11 50
20 1 1 1 50
21 1 1 1 85
22 1 1 1 80
23 1j. 1 1 45
24 1 1 1 45
25 -i-L 1 1-1- 47
26 1 1 1 52
27 1 1 1 45
28 1 1 1_ 90
29 1 1 1 48
30 "11 1 1 53
31 1 1 1 48
32 1 1 1 50
33 1 1 1 47
34 1 1 --L 50
35 1 1 1 45
36 1-L 1 -1 45
37 1 1 -j 45
38 1 1 1 45
39 1 1 1 80
40 1 1 1 50
41 1 1 1 80
42 1 1 1 53
43 1 1 1 82
44 1 1 1 45
46
45 1 1 1 85
46 1 i 1 50
47 1 1 1 50
48 1 1 1 45
49 1 1 X 45
50 1 1 1 85
51 2 1 1 47
52 2 1 52
53 2 1 1 97
54 2 1 1 130
55 2 i 1 81
56 2 1 1 56
57 2 1 1 48
58 2 1 1J. 59
59 2 1 1 86
60 2 1l 1 50
61 2 1 1_ 86
62 2 1 1 48
63 2 1 1X 117
64 2 i_ 1 81
65 2 1 1 48
66 2 -i 1 94
67 2 i_ -1X 122
68 2 -iX X 47
69 2 1 1-L 84
7 2 1 1 97
71 2 1 1 104
72 2 . 1 J_ 45
73 2 1 1 117
74 2 1-1- 80
75 2 1 1 94
76 2 1 1 45
77 2 1 1 83
78 2 1 1 97
79 2 1 1 58
80 2 1 1 55
81 2 1 1 61
82 2 1 1 51
83 2 1 1 48
84 2 1 1 45
85 2 1 1 125
86 2 1 1 94
87 2 1 1 50
88 2 1 1 57
89 2 1 1-L 83
90 2 1 X 133
91 2 1 -1J- 98
92 2 ]_ 1 58
93 2 1 1 45
94 2 1 1 61
95 2 1 1 93
96 2 1 1 63
47
97 2 1 1 87
98 2 1 1 63
99 2 1 1 51
100 2 1 1 48
101 1 2 i 45
102 1 2 1 45
103 1 2 1 45
104 1 2 1 55
105 1 2 1 55
106 1 2 1 45
107 -L 2 i 48
108 1 2 1 85
109 1 2 1 48
110 1 2 1 50
111 1i. 2 1_ 45
112 -1-L 2 1 85
113 1 2 ]_ 85
114 1 2 1 48
115 1 2 1 45
116 1 2 -1X 50
117 1 2 45
118 1 2 1 47
119 1 2 1 83
120 1 2 1 45
121 1 2 1 50
122 1 2 1 45
123 1 2 "1 55
124 1 2 1 47
125 1 2 1 50
126 1 2 J. 82
127 1 2 1X 45
128 1 2 1 45
129 1 2 1 45
130 1 2 1 50
131 1 2 1 45
132 1 2 1J- 50
133 1 2 X 80
134 1-1- 2 1 52
135 1 2 1 45
136 1 2 1 45
137 1 2 1 50
138 1 2 1 45
139 1 2 1 50
140 1 2 1 45
141 1 2 1 45
142 1 2 1 83
143 1 2 1 47
144 1 2 1 52
145 1 2 1 50
146 1 2 1 45
147 1 2 1 83
148 1 2 1X 45
48
149 1 2 1 53
150 1 2 1 83
151 1 1 2 120
152 1 1 2 49
153 1 1 2 81
154 1 1 2 47
155 1 1 2 88
156 1 1 2 102
157 1 1 2 81
158 1 1 2 50
159 1 1 2 134
160 1 1 2 97
161 1 1 2 115
162 1 1 2 84
163 1 1 2 84
164 1 1 2 86
165 1 1 2 86
166 -i 1 2 87
167 1 1 2 94
168 1 2 83
169 1 1 2 124
170 i 1 2 125
171 iJL 1 2 85
172 1 1 2 63
173 1 1-L 2 129
174 1 1 2 83
175 1 1 2 52
176 1 . 1 2 57
177 1 1 2 99
178 1 1 2 87
179 1 1 2 94
180 1 1 2 80
181 1 1 2 85
182 1 1 2 95
183 -1-L 1 2 49
184 i1 1 2 49
185 1 1 2 90
186 1 1 2 81
187 1 1 2 53
188 1 1 2 48





191 i 1 2 85
192 1 1 2 87
193 iX 1 2 120
194 1 1 2 57
195 1 1 2 45
196 1 1 2 120
197 1 1-L 2 119
198 1 1 2 115
199 1 1 2 49
200 1 1 2 52
49
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95244 2 2 1 105245 2 2 1X 90246 2 2 1 94247 2 2 1 87248 2 2 1 100249 2 2 1_ 89250 2 2 1_ 99251 2 ]_ 2 100252 2 1 2 160
50
253 2 1 2 90
254 2 1 2 105
255 2 1 2 90
256 2 1 2 94
257 2 1 2 104
258 2 1 2 94
259 2 1 2 100
260 2 1 2 100
261 2 1 2 89
262 2 1 2 83
263 2 1 2 48
264 2 1 2 83
265 2 1 2 80
266 2 1 2 152
267 2 1 2 88
268 2 1 2 305
269 2 1 2 91
270 2 1 2 194
271 2 X 2 96
272 2 1 2 104
273 2 1 2 106
274 2 1 2 100
275 2 1 2 90
276 2 1 2 166
277 2 1 2 160
278 2 1 2 90
279 2 1 2 90
280 2 1 2 94
281 2 1 2 100
282 2 1 2 160
283 2 1 2 106
284 2 1 2 104
285 2 1 2 90
286 2 1 2 90
287 2 1 2 106
288 2 1 2 164
289 2 1 2 170
290 2 1 2 94
291 2 1 2 90
292 2 1 2 170
293 2 1 2 170
294 2 1 2 96
295 2 1 2 90
296 2 1 2 100
297 2 1 2 90
298 2 1 2 94
299 2 1 2 166
300 2 1 2 90
301 1 2 2 161
302 1 2 2 66
303 1 2 2 190
304 1 2 2 168
51
305 1 2 2 45
306 1 2 2 165
307 -iJ. 2 2 76
308 1 2 2 «-7 -1
309 1 2 2 191
310 1 2 2 159
311 1 2 2 159
312 1 2 2 89
313 1 2 2 96
314 1 2 2 100
315 1 2 2 93
316 1 2 2 89
317 1 2 2 90
318 1 2 2 162
319 1 2 2 164
320 1 2 2 158
321 1 2 2 90
322 1 2 2 160
323 1 2 2 100
324 1 2 2 90
325 1 2 2 176
326 1 2 2 170
327 1 2 2 94
328 1 2 2 100
329 1 2 2 90
330 1 2 2 173
331 1 2 2 111
332 1 2 2 166
333 1 2 2 67
334 1_ 2 2 94
335 -i 2 2 90
336 1 2 2 199
337 1 2 2 160
338 1 2 2 174
339 1 2 2 90
340 1 2 2 206
341 1 2 2 197
342 1 2 2 95
343 1 2 2 180
344 1 2 2 67
345 1 2 2 159
346 1 2 2 159
347 1 2 2 191
348 1 2 2 207
349 1 2 2 61
350 1 2 2 201
351 2 2 2 330
352 2 2 2 164
353 2 2 2 182
354 2 2 2 172
355 2 2 2 192
356 2 2 2 300
52
357 2 2 2 164
358 2 2 2 168
359 2 2 2 90
360 2 2 2 180
361 2 2 2 180
362 2 2 2 172
363 2 2 2 98
364 2 2 2 172
365 2 2 2 182
366 2 2 2 176
367 2 2 2 114
368 2 2 2 184
369 2 2 2 232
370 2 2 2 114
371 2 2 2 196
372 2 2 2 90
373 2 2 2 182
374 2 2 2 172
375 2 2 2 94
376 2 2 2 164
377 2 2 2 108
378 2 2 2 180
379 2 2 z 94
380 2 2 2 170
381 2 2 2 194
382 2 2 2 104
383 2 2 2 110
384 2 2 2 102
385 2 2 2 172
386 2 2 2 176
387 2 2 2 240
388 2 2 2 188
389 2 2 2 114
390 2 2 2 178
391 2 2 2 164
392 2 2 2 124
393 2 2 2 176
394 2 2 2 234
395 2 2 2 174
396 2 2 2 240
397 2 2 2 238
398 2 2 2 184
399 2 2 2 184
400 2 2 2 160
53
CI C2 C3 C4
DA CD PSY TIME
1
1 1 1 48
2 X 1 1 45
3 1 1 1 47
4 1 1 1 45
5 1 1 1 45
\3 1 1 1 50
7 1X 1 1 45
8 1 1 1 45
9 1 1 1 45
10 1 1 1 45
11 1 1 1 48
12 1 1 1 45
13 1 1 1 48
14 1 1 1 48
15 1 1 1 45
16 1 1 1 50
17 1 1 1 45
18 1 1 1 48
19 1 1 1 45
20 1 1 1 45
21 1 1 1 45
22 1 1 1 47
23 1 1 1 80
24 1 1 X 52
25 -1X 1 3_ 83
26 1 1 1 85
27 1 1 1 50
28 1 1 j_ 45
29 1 1 1_ 48
30 1 X '; 45
31 1 1 l 45
32 1 1 l 53
33 1 1 1X 45
34 1 1 1_ 48
35 1 1 1X 45
36 1 1 1 50
37 1 1 1 45
38 1 1 1 45
39 1 1 1 45
40 1 1 1 80
41 1 1 1 45
42 1 1 1X 45
43 1 1 1 50
44 1 1 1 45
45 1 1 1 45
46 1 1 1 45
47 1 1 1 45
48 1 1 1 50
49 1 1 1 45
50 1 1 1 45
54
51 2 1 1 45
52 2 1 1 45
53 2 1 1 47
54 2 1 1 45
55 2 1 45
56 2 1 1 45
57 2 1 1 45
58 2 1 1 80
59 2 1JL 1 45
60 2 1 iJL 48
61 2 1 J- 97
62 2 1 1 84
63 2 1 1 49
64 2 1 1 89
65 2 1 1 48
66 2 1 1 47
67 2 1X 1 59
68 2 -ix 1 82
69 2 1 1J. 82
70 2 1 1JL 47
71 2 1 1J- 52
72 2 1 1 46
73 2 1 1 83
74 2 1 1 45
75 2 1 1 46
76 2 1 1 92
77 2 1 1 57
78 2 , 1 1 45
79 2 1 1 98
80 2 1 1 45
81 2 1 1 45
82 2 1 1 54
83 2 JL 1 55
84 2 1 1 53
85 2 1 1 65
86 2 X 1 48
87 2 1 1 48
88 2 1 1 90
89 2 1 1 58
90 2 1 1 85
91 2 1 1-L 45
92 2 1 1J. 67
93 2 1 1 58
94 2 1 1 54
95 2 1 1X 81
96 2 1 1_ 82
97 2 1 1-I- 98
98 2 1 1 50
99 2 1 1 98
100 2 1 1 94
101 1 2 1 85
102 1 2 1 90
55
103 1 2 1 118
104 1 2 1 86
105 1 2 1 52
106 1 2 1 46
107 1 2 1 83
108 1 2 1 86
109 1 2 1 56
110 1 2 I 45
111 1 2 1 94
112 1 2 1 53
113 1 2 1 52
114 1 2 1 87
115 1 2 1 50
116 1 2 1 87
117 1 2 1 87
118 1 2 1 51
119 1 2 1 93
120 1 2 1 52
121 1 2 1 45
122 1 2 1 45
123 1 2 1 52
124 1 2 1 46
125 1 2 1 57
126 1 2 1 47
127 1 2 1 46
128 1 2 1 90
129 1 2 1 121
130 1 2 1 153
131 1 2 1 157
132 1 2 1 46
133 1 2 1 91
134 1 2 1 45
135 1 2 1 92
136 1 2 1 91
137 1 2 i 49
138 1 2 _|_ 92
139 1 2 1 46
140 1 2 1 56
141 1 2 1 48
142 1 2 1 82
143 1 2 1 46
144 1 2 1 89
145 1 2 1 83
146 1 2 1 54
147 1 2 1 82
148 1 2 l 47
149 1 2 i 48
150 1 2 i 52
151 1 1 2 86
152 1 1 *>z 51
153 X 1 2 46
154 1 1 2 85
56
155 1 1 2 118
156 1 1 2 47
157 1 1 2 89
158 1 1 2 51
159 1 1 2 85
160 1 1 2 58
161 1 1 2 84
162 i 1 2 93
163 1 1 2 90
164 1 1 2 51
165 1 1 2 50
166 1 1 2 48
167 1 1 2 48
168 1 1 2 161
169 1 1 2 161
170 1 _i_ 2 87
171 1 i 2 84
172 1 j. 2 52
173 1 1 2 49
174 1 i 2 88
175 1 1 2 86
176 1 1 2 90
177 1 1 2 46
178 1 1 2 46
179 1 1 2 100
180 1 1 2 45
181 1 1 2 87
182 1 . i 2 89
183 1 1 2 86
184 1 1 2 55
185 1 1 2 51
186 1 1 2 50
187 1 -i 2 84
188 1 1 2 55
189 1 1 2 46
190 1 1 2 83
191 1 1 2 84
192 1 -i_i_ 2 84
193 1 1 2 119
194 i 1 2 45
195 1 i 2 90
196 1 j_ 2 83
197 1 1 2 46
198 1 1 2 49
199 1 1 2 84
200 1 1 2 49
201 2 2 1 90
202 2 2 1 90
203 2 2 1 90
204 2 2 1 90
205 2 2 1 90
206 2 2 1 100
^7
207 2 2 1 170
208 2 2 1 90
209 2 1 90
210 2 2 1 90
211 2 2 1 90
212 2 2 1 96
213 2 2 1 90
214 2 2 1 100
215 2 2 1 90
216 2 2 1 90
217 2 2 1 90
218 2 2 1 166
219 2 2 1 90
220 2 2 1 90
221 2 2 1 100
222 2 2 i 90
223 2 2 1 90
224 2 2 1 160
225 2 2 1 90
226 2 2 1
.
90
227 2 2 1 166
228 2 2 1 90
229 2 2 1 90
230 2 2 1 90
231 2 2 1 104
232 2 2 1 90
233 2 2 1 90
234 2 2 1 90
235 2 2 1 90
236 2 2 1 90
237 2 2 1 94
238 2 2 1 90
239 2 2 1 94
240 2 2 1 100
241 2 2 1 96
242 2 2 1 90
243 2 2 1 94
244 2 2 1 90
245 2 2 1 90
246 2 2 1 100
247 2 2 1 90
248 2 2 1 90
249 2 2 1 90
250 2 2 1 90
251 2 1 2 170
252 2 1 2 96
253 2 1 2 90
254 2 1 2 90
255 2 1 2 90
256 2 1 2 90
257 2 1 2 170
258 2 1 2 90
259 2 1 2 96
260 2 1 2 90
261 2 -11 2 90
262 2 1 2 160
263 2 1 2 90
264 2 1 2 106
265 2 1 2 90
266 2 1 2 90
267 2 1 2 90
268 2 1 2 100
269 2 1 2 96
270 2 1 2 100
271 2 1 2 90
272 2 1 2 90
273 2 11 2 90
274 2 1 2 90
275 2 1 2 100
276 2 1 2 160
277 2 1 2 90
278 2 1 2 96
279 2 1 2 90
280 2 1 2 90
281 2 1 2 90
282 2 1 2 90
283 2 1 2 100
284 2 1 2 170
285 2 1 2 160
286 2 1 2 90
287 2 1 2 90
288 2 1 2 90
289 2 1 2 90
290 2 1 2 96
2 91 2 1 2 61
292 2 1 2 100
293 2 1 2 86
294 2 1 2 48
295 2 1 2 87
296 2 1 2 81
297 2 1 2 48
298 2 1 2 90
299 2 1 2 48
300 2 1_ 2 89
301 1 2 2 159
302 1 2 2 150
303 1 2 2 155
304 1 2 2 171
305 1 2 2 54
306 1 2 2 45
307 i-L z 2 158
308 1 2 2 54
309 1 2 2 56
310 1 2 2 159
59
311 1 2 2 86
312 1 2 2 82
313 -i 2 2 9
314 1 2 2 59
315 1 2 2 46
316 1 2 2 92
317 1 2 2 60
318 1 2 2 49
319 1 2 2 84
320 1 2 2 95
321 1 2 2 159
322 1 2 2 45
323 1 2 2 59
324 1 2 2 48
325 1J. 2 2 62
326 1 2 2 48
327 1 2 2 179
328 1 2 2 168
329 1 2 2 150
330 1 2 2 161
331 ]_ 2 2 47
332 1 2 2 168
333 1 2 2 51
334 1 2 2 176
335 1 2 2 68
336 1 2 2 167
337 1-1- 2 2 63
338 1 2 2 168
339 1 2 2 51
340 1 2 2 45
341 1 2 2 90
342 1 2 2 60
343 1 2 2 170
344 1 2 2 94
345 1 2 2 71
346 1 2 2 90
347 1 2 2 90
348 1 2 2 94
349 -1 2 2 66
350 1 2 2 167
351 2 2 2 174
352 2 2 2 164
353 2 2 2 92
354 2 2 2 180
355 2 2 2 102
356 2 2 2 304
357 2 2 2 92
358 2 2 2 98
359 2 2 2 92
360 2 2 2 96
3 61 2 2 2 178
362 2 2 2 92
60
363 2 2 2 100
364 2 2 2 184
365 2 2 2 90
366 2 2 2 164
367 2 2 2 166
368 2 2 2 92
369 2 2 2 160
370 2 2 2 242
371 2 2 2 116
372 2 2 2 164
373 2 2 2 166
374 2 2 2 172
375 2 2 2 162
376 2 2 2 188
377 2 2 2 160
378 2 2 2 90
379 2 2 2 166
380 2 2 2 92
381 2 2 2 157
382 2 2 2 177
383 2 2 2 92
384 2 2 2 185
385 2 2 2 89
386 2 2 2 176
387 2 2 2 185
388 2 2 2 159
389 2 2 2 89
390 2 . 2 2 159
391 2 2 2 170
392 2 2 2 100
393 2 2 2 162
394 2 2 2 98
395 2 2 2 98
396 2 2 2 114
397 2 2 2 112
398 2 2 2 100
399 2 2 2 308
400 2 2 2 160
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